Arthur Hallam's Fragments of Being by Gregory Tate
 1 
Arthur Hallam’s Fragments of Being 
 
In his Preface to Arthur Hallam’s Remains, Henry Hallam sums up in a single 
sentence the ‘Essay on the Philosophical Writings of Cicero’ that his son wrote in 
1831: ‘This essay is perhaps too excursive from the prescribed subject’ (Hallam, 1834, 
xviii). This is the sort of tactful but pointed criticism that typifies Hallam senior’s 
assessments of his son’s writing, and, in this case, it would be hard to disagree with 
him. One of Arthur’s many excursions in the essay involves the ‘metaphysical 
analysis’ which his friend James Spedding, in the same Preface, claims to have been 
‘his chief pleasure and strength’ (Hallam, 1834, xxii). He comments: 
 
Of that immense chain of mental successions, which extends from the 
cradle to the death-bed, how few links, comparatively speaking, are 
visible to any other person! Yet from these fragments of being (if the 
expression may be pardoned) you shall hear one decide as confidently 
about the unseen and unimagined whole, as a geologist from his chip of 
stone will explain the structure of the mass to which it belonged. (Hallam, 
1943, 143) 
 
Hallam’s metaphysical analysis, his dissection of life and mind into a fragmented 
succession of mental states, is set against the sort of rationalist but speculative 
synthesis that a geologist might undertake, reconstructing a whole from a fragment. 
Such reconstruction, Hallam implies, is not possible when it comes to ‘fragments of 
being’: a person’s psychology cannot be inferred from those ‘few links’ observable 
by others. 
The questions raised here, about the fragmentation and mutability of personal 
identity and about the difficulty (perhaps the impossibility) of knowing other people, 
are addressed in many of Hallam’s prose writings: the paper ‘On Sympathy’, his 
theological essay ‘Theodicaea Novissima’, and his review of Tennyson’s Poems, 
Chiefly Lyrical. In the essay on Cicero these questions are resolved into one of 
perspective, because, although the self appears plural and discontinuous to others, 
from the inside it feels very different. ‘Could Cicero think of his own being,’ Hallam 
asks, ‘and not find it full of mysterious harmony?’ This harmony is evident, he goes 
on to say, in the way in which ‘mental successions’ retain a sense of underlying 
cohesion: 
 
Endless are the divers undulations of sentiment and idea, which pass 
through, if they do not compose, the sentient being: yet they fluctuate 
according to settled laws, and every faculty keeps it prescribed limits, 
without any variation, or the least disturbance. (Hallam, 1943, 174) 
 
Hallam’s terminology of sentiments and ideas points to his interest in the 
associationist psychology of David Hartley’s 1749 Observations on Man, which he 
read in the autumn of 1830 (Hallam, 1981, 379). The influence of Hartleyan 
associationism, which defines the mind as a series of discrete ideas that have their 
origins in changing physical sensations and that are linked together through an 
involuntary process of association, is evident throughout Hallam’s essays. His 
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response to associationism in the essay on Cicero is characteristic: while he 
concedes that ‘the sentient being’ might be composed of transient ‘undulations’, he 
also maintains that some principle of coherence guarantees the permanence of this 
being. Policed by ‘settled laws’ and ‘prescribed limits’, the potentially discordant 
fluctuations of the psyche are modulated into ‘mysterious harmony’. The problem 
remains, however, that this inner harmony cannot be heard by others, and that the 
whole self is ‘unseen and unimagined’ as it collapses, in the eyes and ears of other 
people, into fragments of being. 
 The affective capacities of poetry offered one possible solution to this 
problem for Hallam. As well as being central to his philosophical and metaphysical 
thinking, the question of whether the mind is in essence successive or cohesive, 
fragmented or unified, also helped to shape his conception of poetry. In his essay on 
Cicero he states that 
  
Poetry, indeed, is seductive by exciting in us that mood of feeling which 
conjoins all mental states that pass in review before it, according to 
congruity of sentiment, not agreement of conceptions. (Hallam, 1943, 
150) 
 
Hallam suggests that poetry seduces readers by giving them an assurance of the 
unity of their minds, as it conjoins their mental states into a singular ‘mood of 
feeling’ founded on ‘congruity of sentiment’. Hallam uses the latter phrase again in 
1831, in his review of Poems, Chiefly Lyrical, arguing that ‘a man […] who is 
accustomed to measure his ideas by their logical relations rather than the congruity 
of the sentiments to which they refer’ cannot help but write verse which is ‘good as 
philosophy, powerful as rhetoric, but false as poetry’ (Hallam, 1943, 184-5). This 
claim feeds into the conceptual division, which forms the basis of Hallam’s review, 
between ‘sensation’ and ‘reflection’, the unmediated feeling that is the proper 
concern of poetry and the conscious thought which belongs elsewhere, presumably 
in prose (Hallam, 1943, 186). In the essay on Cicero, then, Hallam asserts that poetry 
stimulates congruity of sentiment in the mind of the reader, and in his review of 
Tennyson he implies that it originates in ‘the congruity of the sentiments’ in the 
poet’s mind. It seems that, in accordance with late-Romantic notions of poetic affect, 
the one is dependent on the other, as the congruity of sentiment inherent in poetry 
enables the poet to communicate his whole self to the reader, not as fragments of 
being but through the medium of a cohesive mood of feeling. 
 Like many of what Hallam called his ‘psychological opinions’ (Hallam, 1943, 
200), the concept of the congruity of sentiment was adapted from Hartleyan 
associationism. In his Observations on Man, Hartley comments that ‘Sensations may 
be said to be associated together, when their impressions are either made precisely 
at the same instant of time, or in the contiguous successive instants’ (Hartley, 1998, I, 
65). This notion that the associative process is not rational, that sensations and 
thoughts join together not through any intrinsic affinity but through synchronicity or 
contiguity, is also traceable in Hallam’s poetic theory, which suggests, as Eric 
Griffiths has noted, that ‘the poetic connection is made through remembered and 
particular experiences whose occurrence was merely contingent’ (Griffiths, 1992, 
41). Hallam suggests that the experiences represented in poetry should be organised 
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not through ‘their logical relations’ but through a sort of emotional correspondence. 
Yet this is not quite the same as Hartley’s model of accidental association, because 
while the association of sensations is based on ‘contiguity’, defined by the OED as 
‘proximity’ or ‘the condition of touching or being in contact’, the fashioning of poetic 
sentiment demands ‘congruity’, meaning ‘self-accordance, harmony of the parts of a 
whole, coherence’. Hallam resists associationist psychology’s contingent model of 
the self by suggesting that poetry reveals an essential harmony or coherence which 
underpins the mere contiguity of sensations. This was not always a theoretical issue 
for Hallam; a similar concern informed his own poetic practice. Before he wrote his 
1831 essays, he sought to capture and communicate the congruity of sentiment in 
his verse. This aim is apparent in his ‘Meditative Fragments’, written in 1829, but, as 
the title suggests, Hallam ultimately fails in these poems to integrate either the 
fragments of his being or of his writing. 
 In the second meditative fragment, a poem saturated with the influence of 
Wordsworth’s ‘Tintern Abbey’, Hallam looks on a rural landscape and ponders the 
workings of memory: 
 
It is an English scene: and yet methinks 
Did not yon cottage dim with azure curls 
Of vapour the bright air, and that neat fence 
Gird in the comfort of its quiet walls, 
Or did not yon gay troop of carollers 
Press on the passing breeze a native rhyme, 
I might have deemed me in a foreign land. 
For, as I gaze, old visions of delight, 
That died with th’ hour their parent, are reflected 
From the mysterious mirror of the mind, 
Mingling their forms with these, which I behold. 
Nay, the old feelings in their several states 
Come up before me, and entwine with these 
Of younger birth in strangest unity. 
And yet who bade them forth? Who spake to Time, 
That he should strike the fetters from his slaves? 
Or hath he none? Is the drear prison-house 
To which, ’twould seem, our spiritual acts 
Pass one by one, a phantom—a dim mist 
Enveloping our sphere of agency? 
A guess, which we do hold for certainty?  
I do but mock me with these questionings. (II, 9-30)1 
 
The opening lines are united in their congruity of sentiment (or sentimentality) about 
the delights of rural Britain, but Hallam then abruptly suggests that what should be 
‘native’ feels ‘foreign’ to him. It is not immediately clear why this should be the case, 
but it perhaps has something to do with what he says, in his essay ‘On Sympathy’, 
about the ‘mingled emotions’ which memory prompts. ‘To know a thing as past, and 
                                               
1 All line references to the second and sixth ‘Meditative Fragments’ are from The Writings of Arthur 
Hallam, ed. T.H. Vail Motter (New York: Modern Language Association, 1943), 44-45 and 70-74. 
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to know it as similar to something present,’ Hallam argues, gives ‘pleasure, in so far 
as it is a revelation of self; but there is pain, in so far that it is a divided self, a being 
at once our own and not our own’ (Hallam, 1943, 138). For Hallam, it seems, the past 
is a foreign country, in which the self thinks and feels differently. In this poetic 
fragment, however, the painful self-division that is highlighted by the recollection of 
‘old feelings in their several states’ is pleasurably resolved, as past and present 
sentiments ‘entwine’ in the Wordsworthian flow of his blank verse and in the 
‘strangest unity’ of his mind. 
 This strangest unity, analogous to the mysterious harmony invoked in the 
essay on Cicero, would seem to be a good place to finish for Hallam, an end-stopped 
and definitive (if inexplicable) confirmation of his psychological cohesion. But, as 
Seamus Perry has commented, in Hallam’s writing ‘an interest in the mind’s 
dynamics supercedes the attraction of credal certainty’ (Perry, 2005, 9). Hallam 
cannot help but speculate about the workings of the psyche, and he starts asking 
questions that threaten to unpick the unity that his mind has fashioned. This self-
analytic tendency has already been hinted at in the lines which describe his 
recollections being ‘reflected / From the mysterious mirror of the mind, / Mingling’. 
The alliteration in these lines perhaps constitutes an effort to build some congruity 
into this poetic fragment, but their language of reflection and mirroring carries with 
it implications of psychological division and duality. Building on W. David Shaw’s 
observation that, although Hallam identified Tennyson as a poet of sensation, 
‘Tennyson is a poet of reflection—not simply because he meditates and broods, but 
because like Henry James he “reflects” his world by means of mirrors’, Jane Wright 
has argued that Tennyson often ‘worries about his ability to reflect anything—or 
reflect upon anything—accurately’ (Wright, 2007, 82). The same can be said of 
Hallam here: the ‘mysterious mirror of the mind’ melts into an opaque ‘mist’, and he 
is forced into a succession of vague conjectures which draw further attention to the 
divisions within the self. The final line (‘I do but mock me with these questionings’) 
constitutes a blunt acknowledgement of the intellectual and poetic difficulties 
involved in psychological speculation. 
 Despite these difficulties, though, Hallam persevered in looking for a poetic 
means of resolving his psychological self-questionings. In his sixth meditative 
fragment he seems to have hit on the answer, delivering an impassioned eulogy on 
the glories of poetry: 
 
Oh! there is union, and a tie of blood 
With those who speak unto the general mind, 
Poets and sages! Their high privilege 
Bids them eschew succession’s changefulness, 
And, like eternals, equal influence 
Shed on all times and places. I would be 
A poet, were’t but for this linked delight, 
This consciousness of noble brotherhood, 
Whose joy no heaps of earth can bury up, 
No worldly venture ’minish or destroy, 
For it is higher, than to be personal! (VI, 105-15) 
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According to Hallam, writing poetry, or, more precisely, being a poet, enables the 
fragments of being to be absorbed into cohesion. Poets ‘eschew succession’ and 
partake in a ‘linked delight’ which binds the fluctuations of their personal identity 
into a coherent whole, while also, importantly, tying them to other poets in a 
majestic ‘union’ that surpasses personality. 
 This union is founded on the timelessness of poetry. The psychological 
consequences of existing in time, as a changing self that is simultaneously united and 
divided through memory, preoccupy Hallam throughout his writings, but here he 
claims that poets are exempt from the restrictions of temporal being, as they 
transcend ‘changefulness’ to become ‘like eternals’, influencing ‘all times and 
places.’ Elsewhere, Hallam examines another way in which the self can realise this 
eternal unity. In his ‘Theodicaea Novissima’ he considers the moral and psychological 
implications of viewing human personality from a divine standpoint: 
 
In the Eternal Idea of God a created spirit is perhaps not seen, as a series 
of successive states, of which some that are evil might be compensated 
by others that are good, but as one indivisible object of these almost 
infinitely divisible modes, and that either in accordance with His own 
nature, or in opposition to it. (Hallam, 1943, 210) 
 
There is an echo of Hartley in this suggestion. In the Observations on Man Hartley 
asserts that ‘all sensations and vibrations are infinitely divisible, in respect of time 
and place’ (Hartley, 1998, I, 70), and Hallam’s borrowing of ‘infinitely divisible’ again 
shows the pull that the associationist model of a fragmented and mutable mind had 
on his imagination. God, however, sees the mind not as divisible and successive but 
as indivisible and eternal, comprehending the whole self rather than its fragments. 
 Hallam was not always so strict in his separation of earthly and divine 
perspectives on the psyche. In a note on ‘prayer’, for example, he asserts that ‘the 
philosophy of mind’ and ‘the field of practical religion’ have each been led into 
‘infinite confusion’ by ‘the mistake of setting value on a thing’s origin rather than on 
its character, of assuming that composite must be less excellent than simple’ 
(Tennyson, 1897, I, 44; Hallam’s emphases). This note suggests that theology and 
religious practice, as well as the philosophy of mind, must take account of the 
composite and fluctuating character of the psyche. For the most part, however, 
Hallam himself assumes ‘that composite must be less excellent than simple,’ and he 
persistently searches in his writings for a psychological or spiritual unity that can 
integrate the fragments of being. In the ‘Theodicaea Novissima’ he finds this unity in 
God, whose point of view binds the ‘successive states’ of the self in time into an 
eternal whole. In the sixth meditative fragment he finds it in poetry, which is 
presented as a medium through which poets can bind together these successive 
states and in which they can communicate the timeless unity that is otherwise 
hidden from other people. 
 There is, though, one problem: Hallam cannot sustain his rapturous glimpse 
of poetic delight in the sixth fragment. Immediately after extolling the eternal joy of 
poetic communion, which is ‘higher, than to be personal’, he is dragged back down 
to earth in lines that foreground both the unresolved confusions of his personal 
identity and his inescapable status as a self in time: ‘Some minutes passed me by in 
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dubious maze / Of meditation lingering painfully’ (VI, 116-17). This strikes the same 
note of bathos as was sounded in the second fragment, when Hallam’s perception of 
his mind’s strangest unity collapsed under the pressure of self-interrogation. Here, 
again, he struggles to maintain the congruity of sentiment that he saw as essential to 
poetry, and he slips instead into reflective (and painful) meditation. Poets might be 
capable of uniting the fragments of their being, but it seems that Hallam, by his own 
definition, might not be a poet, and at the end of the sixth fragment he implies that 
he cannot count himself among the poetic brotherhood which he celebrates. He 
describes a state of mental anguish which might well be his own: 
 
But when our feelings coil upon themselves 
At time’s rude pressure; when the heart grows dry, 
And burning with immedicable thirst 
As though a plague-spot seared it, while the brain 
Fevers with cogitations void of love, (VI, 128-32) 
 
‘When this change comes, as come it will to most,’ Hallam continues, the only 
remedy for the suffering is to ‘strive to build the philosophic mind’ (VI, 133, 127). The 
allusion to ‘the philosophic mind’ of Wordsworth’s ‘Ode: Intimations of Immortality’ 
suggests that Hallam has stoically resigned himself to the psychological adversities 
which he claims elsewhere that poetry can mitigate: the closing up of feeling; the 
mind’s tendency to drift into self-involved cogitation; the pressure of time; the 
mutability of the self. The embodied mind is not indivisible but composite, and the 
painful feelings of the dry heart and the fevered brain are evidently not the sort of 
sensations that Hallam saw as conducive to poetry. This poem might help to explain 
why Hallam wrote very little verse in the last two years of his life, and instead 
concentrated on building the contemplative and philosophic mind that emerges in 
his prose. While his prose writings still cling to the belief that poetry’s congruity of 
sentiment can repair the fragments of being, his meditative and fragmented poems 
told him otherwise. 
 
Gregory Tate 
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